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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA G. SMITH (TAYLOR,) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
vs. : 
SCOTT G. SMITH. : Case No. 890025-CA 
Defendant-Appellant- : Category 7 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this domestic 
relations matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (g) (Supp. 
1989) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Did the trial court err in granting plaintiff-respondentfs 
motion in limine, which motion precluded defendant-appellant from 
introducing evidence at the hearing regarding plaintiff-respondent's 
contempt from the time the parties were divorced on April 13, 1981 until 
plaintiff-respondent was found in contempt of Court for her failure to 
allow visitation to defendant-appellant, which order was entered by the 
Court on December 14, 1984? 
II. Did the trial court err in failing to find a material change 
of circumstances when it only considered plaintiff-respondentfs 
contemptuous behavior since December 14, 1984 and not since the decree 
n-e riwnrne which was entered on April 13, 1981? 
III. Did the trial court err in failing to find that 
plaintiff-respondent's interference with defendant's visitation rights 
constituted a substantial and material change in circumstances which 
supports a change of custody? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, § 30-3-10(1) and (2) (1988), and Rule 52 Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure (1988) are the applicable statutes in this 
natter, copies of which are included at Appendix "A". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OP THE CASE AND DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
This is an appeal from an Order of the Fourth Judicial District 
:ourtf in which the Honorable Ray M. Harding ruled that defendant-
Lppellant's (Scott Smith) Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce be 
lismissed in that there was not a showing of a material change of 
•ircumstances to warrant a change in custody of the parties' minor child 
Jesse) from plaintiff-respondent (Patricia Taylor), to Scott Smith. 
Scott Smith appeals from this ruling stating that the true nature 
f the circumstances was never presented to the court in connection with 
petition to modify custody due to the Court granting a Motion in 
imine excluding prior evidence of visitation violations. 
B. COURSE OP THE PROCEEDINGS AND RELEVANT FACTS. 
On April 13, 1981 the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, of the Fourth 
udicial District Court of Utah County, entered a Decree of Divorce to 
i^e captioned parties. Scott Smith was not present at the hearing but 
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had filed a Consent and Waiver for Entry of Judgment with the Court. 
At the hearing Patricia Taylor was granted the custody of the parties1 
minor child, Jesse, and Scott was granted reasonable visitation. (R. 
12-16) . 
On August 14, 1981 the Honorable Maurice Harding of the Fourth 
Judicial District Court held a hearing on Scott's Motion for Order to 
Show Cause filed July 20, 1981, (R. 19) and entered an Order Modifying 
Decree (R. 27-28) which specifically defined Scott's visitation. 
Following the August 14, 1981 Order to Show Cause Hearing Patricia 
Taylor and Jesse moved to Mexico, (R. 506-7) , and later to the State of 
Arizona, (R. 507-8), both moves seriously frustrating Scott's visitation 
rights. Scott sought the aid of the Court in enforcing his visitation 
rights through another Order to Show Cause Hearing, which was 
subsequently heard on August 17, 1982 before Judge Bullock. Scott was 
ordered to pay child support to the Court because of the difficulty of 
locating Patricia. (R. 79-80). 
Scott continued to have difficulty with his visitation and 
petitioned the Court for an Order to Show Cause hearing on August 13, 
1984. Scott questioned why Patricia should not be held in contempt for 
her failure to allow Scott visitation after she moved to Mexico and then 
relocated herself and Jesse to the State of Arizona without notifying 
Scott of Jesse's whereabouts. (R. 89-91). The hearing held before 
Judge Bullock on October 3, 1984 was continued to a later date. (R.98-
100) . 
On December 11, 1984, both parties appeared before Judge Bullock 
3 
md an Order Modifying Decree was entered on December 14, 1984. In the 
>rder Scott's visitation was set forth in greater detail and Patricia 
ras found to be in contempt of Court for her deliberate denial of 
cott's visitation rights. (R. 158-65). 
On June 21, 1988, Scott filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of 
ivorce based on Patricia Taylor's continued attempts to thwart his 
isitation with his son. Scott represents that such actions constitute 
material change of circumstances which justifies awarding a change of 
ustody of Jesse. (R. 294-98). 
On July 27, 1988, Patricia, through her counsel in Texas, filed a 
otion to Stay Proceedings arguing that custody should be determined in 
exas. (R. 3 06-13). Judge Harding entered a Memorandum Decision 
enying the Motion to Stay Proceedings in that Utah will retain 
urisdiction of the matter. (R. 359-60). 
On December 9, 1988, Patricia filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
R. 402-3) which was later denied due to issues of material fact which 
seded to be presented to the Court. (R. 405). 
On December 13, 1988, prior to the trial, an informal conference 
as held in the chambers of Judge Harding where the Court considered 
itricia Taylor's motion in limine to restrict evidence prior to 
scember 14, 1984. The motion in limine was granted. Due to the motion 
i limine Scott was unable to present evidence to support his petition 
)r custody. Scott's petition was dismissed, and Patricia was still 
)und to be in Contempt of Court. (R. 405-6). 
On April 28, 1989, Scott Smith filed his Notice of Appeal from the 
4 
decision rendered by Judge Harding. (R. 444). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Due to the fact that the original divorce decree was entered by 
default the issue of custody was not fully examined by the court. The 
best interests of the child were not litigated. 
The first time the issue of custody was brought before the Court 
was June 21, 1988. Scott Smith argued that his former wife's persistent 
and malicious interference with his visitation rights constituted a 
material change in circumstances warranting a change in custody. The 
bulk of Scott's evidence was excluded because the Court determined that 
the evidence had already been heard. In so ruling the court erred; 
although the evidence had been heard in regards to contempt 
proceedings, it has never been presented in relation to the issue of 
custody. 
The Court further erred in holding that interference with 
visitation was not a material change of circumstance. Had the Court 
heard all the relevant evidence it could only have concluded that the 
best interests of Jesse Smith would not be served by Patricia Taylor. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
REVIEW THE ENTIRE RECORD 
A, The Change-In-Circumstances Inquiry Is Less Restricted In Non-
diudicated Custody Awards. 
When Scott Smith petitioned the Court to Modify the Divorce Decree 
i June 21, 1988, it was his first attempt in seeking the physical care, 
Dntrol and custody of Jesse, Since the initial decree of divorce in 
Dril 1981, all modifications to the final order of the court were for 
le purpose of more specifically detailing Scott's visitation rights. 
:ott has attempted, but has not been afforded, the opportunity of 
resenting to the Court his reasons for pursuing custody and having the 
mrt determine that he is a fit and proper parent to be awarded custody 
: his son Jesse. 
Custody modification is an area in which a petitioning party has 
high threshold to overcome before the courts will consider changing 
i original decree. In establishing this threshold of stability, the 
>urts have relied upon a two-pronged test for modification of custody, 
tlined in Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982) . As a means of creating 
nsistency in custody disputes, the test requires a finding of material 
ange in circumstances from which the initial custody was based before 
e order is opened to determine the best interests of the child. 
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Maughan v. Maughan, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989) has 
emphasized the importance of this test: "If the initial award was based 
on a thorough examination by the trial court of the various factors 
pertaining to the child's welfare, a rigid application of the change-
in-circumstances prong is in order." In the case before the court the 
initial custody award of Jesse Smith was not based on a thorough 
examination of factors pertaining to the child's best interests. 
Accordingly, a less rigid application of the change-in circumstances 
test is appropriate. 
Scott realizes the importance of the change-in-circumstances 
standard and he attempted to set forth evidence which supported his 
claim of a material change, but was hindered by the Court's granting of 
a motion in limine. The issue Scott now raises is one which Supreme 
Court Justices Stewart and Howe referred to in their concurring opinions 
in Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P. 2d 624 (Utah 1987). In that case the Justices 
cautioned a rigid application of the "change-in-circumstance" 
requirement while agreeing with the need for the standard established 
in Hogge. Justice Stewart acknowledged the requirements of Hogge as a 
means to prevent repetitive custody disputes and to aid in fostering 
family stability. He further recognized that in some instances a strict 
application of the requirements in favor of stability could ultimately 
be more detrimental to the interests of the child then the effects of 
changing custody. Justice Howe noted several circumstances where strict 
compliance to Hogge would in essence impede the best interests of the 
7 
shild. Among his examples he specifically voiced his "concern in cases 
/•here a divorce decree and custody of a child is obtained by default. 
En such instances there is no determination made by the court as to 
•hich parent would be superior in raising the child.11 Id. 
Scott desires to be given the opportunity to present evidence which 
supports his claim to custody of Jesse based on the fact that this issue 
las not been fully litigated before the Court. In the initial custody 
ietermination Scott simply executed a Consent and Waiver for Entry of 
"udgment and the custody award was obtained by default. Evidence was 
Lot presented to suggest that Jessef s best interests were thoroughly 
xamined prior to the original award of custody nor to determine the 
itness of Scott as a parent. 
The application of the Hogge two-prong test was questioned recently 
n Bake v. Bake, 106 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Ct.App 1989) . Neal and Vickey Bake 
ere granted a divorce on August 19, 1985, and pursuant to their 
tipulation the original decree awarded custody of their two sons to 
eal under the provision that if the boys later decided that they would 
ike to live with their mother custody could be changed without a need 
o show a change of circumstance. The boys eventually did decide they 
anted to live with their mother and she filed a petition to change 
astody. The Court granted Vickey1s petition and Neal appealed stating 
lat the trial court erred in not applying the two-prong test of Hogge. 
On appeal this Court referred to Maughan, supra. 7, "the scope of the 
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change-in-circumstances inquiry is less restricted when the initial 
custody award was not premised on an examination of the child's best 
interests," Id. at 46. The custody of the Bake children was not 
examined but rather based on the parent's stipulation, and under these 
circumstances the court could "accept a greater range of evidence under 
Hogge's first prong regarding the initial custody arrangement, the 
events that have since transpired, and the resulting effects on the 
child." Id. Likewise, in the case at hand, Scott was not granted the 
opportunity to present evidence regarding the initial decree, the events 
that transpired since the initial decree, or the overall effects his 
limited visitation has had on his relationship with his son. 
In granting Patricia's Motion in Limine the Court stated that 
evidence prior to December 14, 1984, was heard by the court in the 
contempt hearing and that the presentation of any evidence in that 
regard was unnecessary. (R. 589 at p. 4-7). But in contrast to this 
decision, the Court of Appeals has ruled that when custody 
determinations are not adjudicated the res judicata policy underlying 
custody is given less weight, and that the res judicata aspect of the 
changed-circumstances rule "must always be subservient to the best 
interests of the child. . . When a child's custody is determined by 
stipulation or default, the custody determination may in fact be at odds 
with the best interests of the child." Elmer v. Elmer; 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 
37 (Ct.App. 1989). At no time during the pendency of this case in the 
Fourth District Court was an impartial determination made as to the best 
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interests of the child. For this reason Scott wishes to present all the 
evidence to the Court which would support adequate findings upon which 
a custody award can be based. 
B. The Findings Of The Court Should Set Forth The Facts Upon 
Which The Ultimate Decision Was Based. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52 (1987) states the purpose and guidelines for 
findings by the court: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury 
or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the 
facts specially and state separately its conclusions 
of law thereon,. . .in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly 
set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law which constitute the grounds of its action. 
This Court recently addressed the issue of adequate findings in 
T
ensen v. Jensen, 110 Utah Adv. Rep. 2 7 (Ct.App. 198 9) . Raymond and LaRae 
Jensen were divorced on February, 10, 1987, and Raymond was awarded 
custody of the parties three minor children, as well as LaRaefs two 
:hildren from a previous marriage, which Raymond had adopted. In June 
L987 LaRae sought custody of the children. On October 15, 1987, the 
lecree was amended to award custody of the two older children to LaRae 
Dased on the agreement in the initial decree that the two older children 
:ould elect to have custody changed. The Court determined that there 
/as not a material change of circumstance to warrant changing custody 
)f the three younger children so they remained with Raymond. The trial 
:ourt failed to make findings regarding the portion of the petition 
relating to the younger children, and LaRae appealed from that portion 
10 
of the order. 
In seeking custody of her younger children LaRae relied upon the 
theory of changed circumstances, but "other than an unsigned statement 
by the court that Raymond is still the primary caretaker, the trial 
courtfs order neither discusses LaRaefs evidence in support of her 
affidavit, nor compares that evidence with the factors underlying the 
original award." Id. at 28. The initial custody award findings did not 
detail the reasoning for the Court's decision; it simply concluded that 
Raymond was a "proper parent to be awarded the care, custody and control 
of the minor children." Id. at 29. With only the statement of Raymond 
being a proper parent there was not a means of comparing the initial 
decree with LaRae's claimed change in circumstances. The Court ruled: 
Because there is simply insufficient factual grounds 
expressed to conclude whether a change of 
circumstances has been demonstrated, we are 
compelled to remand the case to the trial court for 
entry of appropriate findings. Those findings 
should articulate the considerations behind the 
initial award of custody and the order denying 
modification, and should reflect the current legal 
standard for modification of custody. 
Id. at 29. The Court vacated the trial courtf s order denying LaRae' s 
petition and remanded for entry of appropriate findings. 
The importance of appropriate findings is emphasized in Smith v. Smith, 
726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986): 
To ensure that the trial court's custody 
determination, discretionary as it is, . . . is 
rationally based, it is essential that the court 
set forth in its findings of fact not only that it 
finds one parent to be the better person to care 
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for the child, but also the basic facts which show why that ultimate 
inclusion is justified . • • Proper findings of fact ensure that the 
iltimate custody award follows logically from, and is supported by, the 
evidence and the controlling legal principles• Adequate findings are 
ilso necessary for this Court to perform its assigned review function. 
In Smith the Supreme Court of Utah reversed and remanded the trial court's 
)rder due to the fact that the written findings and statements did not 
institute adequate findings. Another recent case explains: "Adequate 
findings are those that (1) are sufficiently detailed, (2) include 
enough facts to disclose the process through which the ultimate 
:onclusion is reached, (3) indicate the process is logical and properly 
;upported, and (4) are not clearly erroneous." Marchant v. Marchant, 743 
>.2d 199, 203 (Utah App. 1987). Unless the findings meet this standard, 
.he issue of custody must be reversed. Id. 
A review of the findings of fact in the matter currently before 
.his Court clearly shows the above standard was not met. The Findings 
f Fact and Conclusions of Law filed from the initial decree of divorce 
Appendix "B"), stated that Patricia (Smith) Taylor was "a fit and 
roper parent and should be awarded the sole care and custody of the 
inor child of the parties," and granted Scott Smith "reasonable 
isitation," (R. 12-14). The Findings of Fact entered by the Court on 
cott's petition to modify (Appendix "C"), stated both parents were fit, 
nd there was not a material change of circumstances warranting a change 
f custody. (R. 436-438). In applying the standard for "adequate 
indings" to this case: (1) The Court failed to provide sufficient 
detail, simply disclosing that both parents were fit, and that there was 
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no material change of circumstances; (2) The findings failed to state 
the basis for its determination that there was not a material change, 
and did not disclose the process by which the Court reached this 
decision; (3) There is no indication that the process is logical or 
supported; (4) There was not enough evidence presented to the court 
to determine if a change of circumstances clearly exists. The findings 
having not met this standard, the issue of custody must therefore be 
reversed. Marchant, supra. 
The initial award of custody, as previously stated, was not fully 
litigated due to the fact that the decree and award of custody were 
entered by default. There have been modifications to the initial decree 
in attempts to reconcile problems associated with Scott's visitation, 
but the only instance in which Scott has attempted to change custody of 
Jesse is the decision from which he now appeals. Had the trial court 
heard the entire record it would have been better able to determine the 
true nature of the claimed change-in-circumstances. 
POINT II 
INTERFERENCE WITH VISITATION CONSTITUTES 
A MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH SHOULD 
WARRANT A CHANGE IN CUSTODY 
It is well established that the prime concern of the courts in any 
custody matters is the welfare of the children and the standard is "the 
best interest of the child." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10. In Pusey v. Pusey, 
728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court stated that the "best 
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.nterest" standard should be based on function-related factors, and 
•ef erred to Atkinson, Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate Courts, 
.8 Fam.L.Q. 1 (Spring 1984), for those factors- The Atkinson article 
liscusses the interference with visitation problem specifically. The 
•easoning goes as follows: Simply because two individuals have 
letermined they can no longer continue their lives together does not 
tliminate a child's need to have an association with both parents. 
>uring the process of obtaining a divorce where a child is involved it 
s the child who suffers the greatest loss and disruption. Upon order 
• f the court one parent is awarded custody and the other is granted 
isitation rights in hopes that the child will be able to continue a 
ealthy relationship with both parents. While the child's need for 
ecurity in these situations escalates, in many instances it is 
overlooked. All too often a child is exposed to parents1 
houghtlessness as the child is used as parents1 avenue for expressing 
nimosity to each other as they attempt to severe their marital 
•elationship. For this reason, and many others, great consideration 
hould be given to determining which parent will foster a frequent and 
ontinuing relationship and contact between the child and the non-
ustodial parent because of the child's need for that continued 
ssociation with both parents. See Atkinson at page 25. Indeed, "The 
est welfare of minor children is promoted by having such children 
espect and love both parents." Thurman v. Thurman, 245 P.2d 810, 814 
Idaho 1952). 
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Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10(2) states: 
In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among 
other factors the court finds relevant, which parent 
is most likely to act in the best interests of the 
child, including allowing the child frequent and 
continuing contact with the noncustodial parent as 
the court finds appropriate. (1988) 
Two benefits can be attributed to ascertaining the most giving parent: 
(1) "the child has easier access to the security and love of both 
parents; and" (2) "the parent who is giving is usually more emotionally 
healthy and a better role model for the child." Atkinson, supra. 
A number of surrounding states have reviewed the effects of 
custodial parents interfering with the visitation rights of non-
custodial parents and have determined that such actions have a direct 
bearing on the best interests of the child. Atkinson explains: 
Courts with increasing frequency are changing 
custody if the custodial parent is interfering with 
visitation. In extreme cases in which the custodial 
parent has completely thwarted or severely limited 
the visitation for several months, the interference 
with visitation by itself has been a sufficient 
basis to modify custody." 
Atkinson at p. 26. Although Utah, to this point, has not yet ruled on 
the issue of visitation interference, several other states have 
determined the circumstances which may allow change of custody to occur: 
New Mexicofs Lopez v. Lopez, 639 P.2d 1186, 28 ALR4th 1, (N.M. 1981), 
addressed a similar issue as the one at bar. Nancy and Dagoberto Lopez 
were divorced in 1977 and the custody of their son, Cid, was awarded to 
Nancy with visitation rights to Dagoberto. From the time of the decree 
)f divorce there were problems with visitation. In February 1979, the 
parties agreed to a specific visitation schedule to hopefully resolve 
the problem, but problems persisted• Cid was moved from New Mexico to 
Washington D.C., then to California, and later to a different city in 
sTew Mexico, all without informing Dagoberto of his whereabouts* Upon 
Locating his son Dagoberto filed for a change of custody, and Nancy was 
found in contempt of Court for failure to comply with the court ordered 
/isitation rights. 
The trial court considered all factors of each parties relationship 
tfith Cid, but their overriding consideration was Nancy's "lack of 
cooperation and prior refusal to follow the trial court order concerning 
/isitation." Annot., 28 ALR4th 1, 5 (1984). The trial court determined 
:hat the best interests of Cid would be best served by changing custody 
:o his father. On appeal the Supreme Court of New Mexico observed that 
rtien the custodial parent intentionally thwarts or frustrates the 
/isitation rights of the non-custodial parent change in custody is 
warranted. The act of preventing a child from being with his father is 
Inconsistent with the best interests of the child. Lopez, referring to 
Marriage of Ciganovich, 61 Cal.App.3d 289, 132 Cal.Rptr. 261 (1976); and 
Zntwistle v. Entwistle, 61 App.Div.2d 380, 402 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1978). 
In its own decision (Hester v. Hester, 676 P.2d 1338 (N.M.App. 1984)), 
:he Court of Appeals of New Mexico affirmed Lopez, holding: "When the 
custodial parent intentionally takes action to frustrate or eliminate 
the visitation rights of the non-custodial parent, a change of custody 
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is an appropriate action." 
The Idaho Courts have voiced a similar approval: "Modification of 
custody of minor children . . • is proper where it appears that the 
custodial parent has contrived to prevent the other parent from seeing 
and visiting such children in the manner and spirit provided for in the 
decree." Thurman, supra. 14, at 814. 
The Court of Appeals in Arizona was presented with a comparable 
issue in Stapley v. Stapley, 485 P.2d 1181 (Ariz.App. 1971). The Stapley's 
were divorced in August 1967. In December 1968, after difficulties 
arose regarding visitation, the father petitioned for a modification in 
custody to specify his visitation rights. In July 1969, he again 
petitioned the court, this time for a change in custody due to the 
mother's refusal to comply with visitation. The court found her in 
contempt for violating the prior visitation orders and said contempt 
could be purged upon strict compliance with visitation. The problem 
continued and again the father petitioned for a change in custody in 
December 1969. The trial court determined that the best interests of 
the children would be best served by changing custody to the father. 
The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision 
and stated, "Although courts should not change custody as punishment for 
contempt, we believe it is not inappropriate to consider such conduct 
both as a change of condition and as a factor in determining the child's 
welfare." Id. The Arizona Court further articulated: 
It was not inappropriate to consider the mother's 
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conduct which occurred between the time she was 
awarded custody and the denial of the husband's 
July, 1969 request for modification in order to show 
changed conditions. 
W. The Stapley case relates directly to that of the case presently 
Defore the Court. Patricia Taylor was found to have made willful 
attempts to interfere and thwart Scott Smith's visitation rights. Scott 
nade numerous petitions to the court for modification of his visitation. 
3ut even after those attempts Patricia was still found to be in contempt 
Df court. (R. 426) . As stated in Stapley, it would have been appropriate 
for the lower court to have reviewed the entire record from the initial 
iecree to the date of Scott's petition for change in custody. Had the 
:rial court viewed all the evidence, the material nature of visitation 
Interference would have been more clearly presented to the Court and 
tfould have warranted a finding that a material change of circumstances 
ias occurred. 
In Stapley, the Arizona Court found that the mother had not curbed 
ler animosity towards the father and that she had little regard for 
:ourt orders, both of which adversely reflected her suitability. With 
regards to the mother's willful defiance of the court order, the Arizona 
:ourt quoted a ruling of the Supreme Court of Washington: 
In assuming responsibility for the custody and care 
of children of divorced parents, the courts are 
entitled to expect a custodial parent to assume some 
responsibility imposed by the court as to the care 
of a child. In the instant case, Mrs. Sweeny's 
conduct was not solely a matter of violating a court 
order or of disrespect for the court. That alone 
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is a serious matter and might very well bear upon the determination of 
a parent's fitness to discipline, instruct, and care for a child. 
Certainly, a lack of respect for the courts, for law and order, may 
quite conceivably set an example not conducive to good citizenship or 
to a well-adjusted character or personality on the part of a child. 
Sweeny v. Sweeny, 262 P.2d 207, 213 (Wash. 1953). Parents are role models 
for their children and when determining custody the courts "shall 
consider the best interests of the child and the past conduct and 
demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-10(1). Patricia Taylor's conduct has demonstrated her 
willingness to violate or disrespect the orders of the court, which has 
a bearing on the example she sets for the parties' minor child Jesse. 
Patricia was found to be in contempt of court but was given the 
opportunity to purge herself by complying with the visitation rights of 
Scott. Judge Harding expressed his concerns regarding Patricia's 
unwillingness to comply with Court orders, and her actions were believed 
to be a means of avoiding Utah's jurisdiction. (R. 359). In the 
Memorandum Decision of Judge Harding filed with the Court on December 
19, 1988, Patricia was still found to be in contempt of Court despite 
improvements she had made. The Judge stated that Patricia "as yet had 
not purged herself of contempt due to her continued uncooperative 
attitude in regards to visitation." (R.425-27). 
A parent's respect for law and order does have a bearing on that 
parent's suitability in raising a child and is a factor to which 
consideration should be given in the best interests of a child. Sweeny, 
upra. The Colorado and Missouri Courts are in agreement with this statement: 
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When a parent shows little or no regard for the 
legitimate order of a court relating to custody, 
that fact is certainly one factor for the court to 
weigh in considering suitability of who shall have 
custody of a child along with other facts . . . 
Holland v. Holland, 373 P.2d 525 (Colo. 1962). 
Interference with visitation is a factor properly 
to be considered in determining the welfare of a 
child for the purpose of measuring the custodial 
parent's mental attitude toward law and order,' for 
1[a] person with such little regard for constituted 
authority can hardly lay claim to being an ideal 
person to direct the training and upbringing of a 
young child.f 
Garrett v. Garrett, 464 S.W.2d 740 (Mo.App. 1971) . 
In the case before the Court Scott Smith was granted reasonable 
visitation in the divorce entered by default. The initial decree did 
not set forth with enough specificity when and where visitation would 
occur and so Scott obtained a modification for the purpose of more 
clearly defining his visitation with his son. Subsequent to the 
modification Patricia absconded Jesse to Mexico and failed to notify 
Scott of his son's whereabouts's and denied communication and visitation 
between father and son. Upon locating his son in Mexico, Scott made 
numerous attempts to exercise his visitation none to which Patricia 
would agree. Sometime later, Patricia again relocated herself and 
Jesse, this time to the State of Arizona and again she failed to notify 
Scott of Jesse's whereabouts. In September 1983, Scott found out that 
Jesse was residing in Arizona. (R. 468) . On October 5, 1984, Scott 
attempted to visit his son in Arizona, when he arrived he was denied 
visitation by Patricia's present husband Steve Taylor. (R. 472-73). 
For a period of 37 months Scott was denied his visitation rights with 
Jesse, and finally the issue of visitation came before Judge Bullock on 
December 11, 1984. 
On December 13, 1984, Judge Bullock reconvened with counsel (R. 
571), and presented his conclusions. Judge Bullock termed Patricia's 
contempt of deliberately denying Scott's visitation as a "violation of 
the spirit as well as the letter of the Order," and that she would be 
held in contempt until she purged herself by complying with the 
visitation schedule. (R. 571-72). Judge Bullock stated, "my intent is 
not to punish her (Patricia), but simply to convince her that it's for 
the benefit of everybody to cooperate in giving this kid a relationship 
with his Dad." (R. 576). 
Since Judge Bullock's order Scott has been able to exercise 
visitation with Jesse, but the father-son relationship has been 
seriously thwarted by the visitation interference which occurred since 
August 1981. Although there have been improvements with regards to the 
accessibility of Jesse, Scott's visitation rights have still been 
thwarted, and for this reason Scott has sought a change of custody in 
the best interests of his son Jesse, not merely a modification of his 
visitation rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Judicial District Court erred in limiting the evidence 
.o be presented in support of Scott Smith's Petition to Modify the 
)ecree of Divorce. Based on the previous decisions of this Court the 
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:hange-in-circumstances requirement has a less rigid application when 
seeking a modification of a default divorce. In December 1984 Patricia 
/as found to be in contempt of court for her defying court orders in 
regard to visitation. The Court allowed her the privilege of purging 
lerself of said contempt by strictly adhering to the visitation rights 
)f Scott Smith. In December 1988, the Court determined that Patricia 
lad not yet purged herself of contempt. The full ramifications of 
Patricia's interference with Scott's visitation rights have not been 
)resented to the Court's in light of a petition to change custody. 
It is in the best interest of Jesse Smith for the Court to remand 
:his case to the Fourth Judicial District Court so that evidence can be 
)resented relative to Patricia's interference with visitation prior to 
.984. Defendant-Appellant Scott Smith prays this court to hold the 
iistrict court abused its discretion in granting a motion in limine 
excluding evidence of prior visitation misconduct and remand this matter 
iccordingly. 
DATED this I 7^ day of October 1989. 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
£ 
n 
YNEB 
kTSON. 
ATSON, P.C., f 
CRIBNER & BURROWS 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, with postage prepaid thereon, to the following, this / ^  day 
Q f l f e ^ ^ / 1989: 
Robert L. Moody 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
P.O. Box 1466 
Provo, UT 84603 
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APPENDIX A 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE - 52 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 30-3-10 
30-3-9. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 30-3-9 (R.S. 1898 & C.L. 
1907, § 1213; C.L. 1917, § 3005; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 40-3-9), relating to the forfeiture of 
marital rights by the guilty party in a divorce 
proceeding, was repealed by Laws 1969, ch. 72, 
§ 26. 
30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separation or di-
vorce — Custody consideration. 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are separated, or their 
marriage is declared void or dissolved, the court shall make an order for the 
future care and custody of the minor children as it considers appropriate. In 
determining custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child 
and the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties. 
The court may inquire of the children and take into consideration the chil-
dren's desires regarding the future custody, but the expressed desires are not 
controlling and the court may determine the children's custody otherwise. 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other factors the 
court finds relevant, which parent is most likely to act in the best interests of 
the child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with 
the noncustodial parent as the court finds appropriate. 
History: L. 1903, ch. 82, § 1; C.L. 1907, section (2), and made various stylistic and 
§ 1212x; C.L. 1917, § 3004; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 40-3-10; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 7; 1977, ch. 
122, § 5; 1988, ch. 106, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, designated the 
former provisions as Subsection (1), added Sub-
punctuation changes in Subsection (1). 
Cross-References. — Disposition of prop-
erty and children, § 30-3-5. 
Removal of children from homestead, 
§ 30-2-10. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Appeals. 
Application of section. 
Children's choice. 
Factors in determining child's best interest. 
—Improper factors. 
—Moral character. 
Findings of foreign court. 
Findings required. 
Modification. 
Preference for mother. 
Presumption in favor of natural parents. 
Retention of jurisdiction pending appeal. 
Standard for determining custody. 
Appeals. 
In child custody determinations, the trial 
court's decision should be upheld on appeal un-
less the trial court's action is so flagrantly 
unjust as to constitute an abuse of discretion. 
Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197 (Utah 1981), 
overruled on other grounds, Pusey v. Pusey, 
728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986). 
A determination of the "best interests of the 
child" turns on factors the trial court is best 
able to assess, and only when the action taken 
by the trial court is so unjust as to constitute 
an abuse of discretion should the Supreme 
Court substitute its own judgment. Hirsch v. 
Hirsch, 725 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1986). 
Application of section. 
Where father of an illegitimate child had 
adopted such child by acknowledgment under 
§ 78-30-12, and the father and mother of the 
child had never married, the standards of this 
section were employed in an action between 
the mother and father for custody of the child. 
Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197 (Utah 1981), 
overruled on other grounds, Pusey v. Pusey, 
728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986). 
Concomitant with the rights of a legitimated 
child adopted by the acknowledgement of its 
father are the rights of its biological father. In 
a dispute with the child's mother over visita-
tion rights or custody, the biological father's 
rights with respect to the legitimated child are 
adjudicated under the divorce laws codified in 
§ 30-3-5 and this section. Chandler v. 
Mathews, 734 P.2d 907 (Utah 1987). 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect, In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made 
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions 
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the 
parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Amendment Notes. -^ The 1986 amend- Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
ment, in Subdivision (a), deleted "and" preced- Rule 52, F.R.C.P. 
ing "in granting" in the first sentence, inserted Cross-References. — Masters, Rule 53. 
the third and fifth sentences, rewrote the sixth 
sentence and added the last sentence. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS —Denial of motion. 
—Divorce decree modifications. 
Adoption. —Easement. 
—Abandonment of contract. —Evidentiary disputes. 
—Advisory verdict. —Juvenile action. 
—Breach of contract. —Material issues. 
—Child custody. Harmless error. 
—Contempt. —Submission by prevailing party. 
—Credibility of witnesses. Court's discretion. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA G. SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SCOTT G. SMITH, 
Defendant, 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
and 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 56264 
THIS MATTER was heard before the Honorable J. Robert 
Bullock, Judge of the above-entitled Court, on the 13th day 
of April, 1981. Plaintiff was present in Court and 
represented by Sherwood N. Cook. Defendant was not present 
in Court. The Court noted that Defendant had executed a 
Consent and Waiver for Entry of Judgment which had been duly 
filed with the Court. Upon the basis of record herein and 
Plaintiff's sworn testimony, the Court, being fully advised, 
makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Utah County, State of 
Utah and has been for more than three (3) months immediately 
prior to the commencement of this action. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are wife and husband, 
having married on June 3, 1977, at Provo, Utah. 
3. Plaintiff and Defendant are parents of the 
following minor child: JESSE MALCOLM SMITH, born October 8, 
1978. 
4. Defendant has treated Plaintiff cruelly, causing 
her great mental distress by physically abusing her on 
numerous occasions and by refusing to allow her to have 
contact with her family, 
5. The personal property of the parties should be 
divided as follows: 
(a) To Plaintiff: microwave oven; bunkbeds; 
television set; washer; one dresser; dinette set; vacuum 
cleaner and all her personal belongings and effects. 
(b) To Defendant: couch; waterbed; dryer; 
stereo; dresser; lawn mower and all his personal belongings 
and effects. 
6. Plaintiff should be awarded the 1975 Vega and 
Defendant should be awarded the 1967 Camero. Each should 
assume the obligations associated with their respective 
vehicles. 
7. Plaintiff should not be awarded any sums as 
alimony. 
8. Plaintiff is a fit and proper parent and should be 
awarded the sole care and custody of the minor child of the 
parties. 
9. Defendant should have rights of reasonable 
visitation which shall include, as a minimum, the following: 
(a) Every other weekend. 
(b) One evening during the week that he does not 
visit on the weekend. 
(c) Every other holdiay. 
10. Defendant should be ordered to pay to Plaintiff 
the sum of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE ($125.00) DOLLARS per 
month for the support and maintenance of the minor child of 
the parties until said child should die, marry or reach the 
age of majority, whichever should first occur. 
11. The debts of the parties should be allocated as 
follows: 
(a) Plaintiff should pay, and hold Defendant 
harmless therefrom, the loan from Alpine Credit Union. 
(b) Defendant should payf and hold Plaintiff 
harmless therefrom, the loan from UP&L Credit Union. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff should be awarded a Decree of Divorce 
containing orders consistent with the above Findings of 
Fact, to become final three (3) months from date of entry. 
DATED this 13 day of April, A.D., Jrffll? 
Sherwood N. Cook 
PARKER, McKEOWN, McCONKIE & HILL 
University Mall - Mez. #210 
Oremf Utah 84057 
Telephone: 226-2030 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA G, SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SCOTT G. SMITH, ] 
Defendant, 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
MZivil No, 56264 
THIS MATTER was heard before the Honorable J. Robert 
Bullock, Judge of the above-entitled Court, on the 13th day 
of April, 1981. Plaintiff was present in Court and 
represented by Sherwood N. Cook of PARKER, McKEOWN, McCONKIE 
& HILL, Defendant was not present in Court, The Court 
noted that Defendant had executed a Consent and Waiver for 
Entry of Judgment which had been duly filed with the Court, 
Upon the basis of record herein and Plaintiff's sworn 
testimony, and pursuant to the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law made in this matter; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1, Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce to become 
final three months from date of entry. 
2. The personal property of the parties is hereby 
awarded as follows: 
(a) To Plaintiff: microwave oven; bunkbeds; 
television set; washer; one dresser; dinette set; vacuum 
cleaner and all her personal belongings and effects. 
(b) To Defendant: couch; waterbed; dryer; 
stereo; dresser; lawn mower and all his personal belongings 
and effects. 
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3. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the 1975 Vega and 
Defendant is hereby awarded the 1967 Camero. Each shall 
assume the obligations associated with their respective 
vehicles. 
4. Plaintiff is hereby awarded no sums as alimony. 
5. Plaintiff is a fit and proper parent and is hereby 
awarded the sole care and custody of the minor child of the 
parties. 
6. Defendant shall have rights of reasonable 
visitation which shall include, as a minimumf the following: 
(a) Every other weekend. 
(b) One evening during the week that he does not 
visit on the weekend. 
(c) Every other holiday. 
7. Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to Plaintiff 
the sum of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE ($125.00) DOLLARS per 
month for the support and maintenance of the minor child of 
the parties until said child shall dief marry or reach the 
age of majorityr whichever shall first occur. 
8. The debts of the parties are hereby allocated as 
follows: 
(a) Plaintiff shall pay, and hold Defendant 
harmless therefrom, the loan from Alpine Credit Union. 
(b) Defendant shall pay, and hold Plaintiff 
harmless therefrom, the loan from UP&L Credit Union. 
APPENDIX C 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER 
Robert L. Moody, #2302 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2525 N. Canyon Road 
P.O. Box 1466 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 373-2721 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA G. SMITH (TAYLOR), : 
Plaintiff, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER 
vs. : 
SCOTT G. SMITH, : Case No. 56,264 
Judge: Ray Harding 
Defendant. : 
The above entitled matter having come on regularly for 
hearing before the Court on the 13th day of December, 1988, and 
the Court having heard evidence and having taken the matter under 
advisement and having made in writing its Memorandum Decision, 
now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that both parents are fit. 
2. The Court finds that there has not been a showing 
of a material change of circumstance. 
3. The Court finds that although the Plaintiff's 
conduct has improved since she was found to be in contempt of 
- 1 -
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Court, such improvement has not been sufficient to purge herself 
and the Court should continue its jurisdiction. 
4. The Court finds that the funds held by the 
Defendant and interest pursuant to the previous Order of the 
Court should be paid over to the Plaintiff forthwith. 
The Court having made in writing its Findings of Fact 
now enters the following: 
ORDER 
1. It is hereby ordered that Defendant's Petition to 
Modify the Decree of Divorce is hereby dismissed. 
2. Defendant is ordered forthwith to pay the sums 
ordered paid to the Plaintiff in the Court's Order of June 2, 
1986, and Defendant's subsequent Motion with regard to said Order 
is hereby denied. 
3. Each of the parties is hereby ordered to be 
cooperative with the other and the parties are further ordered 
not to make any disparaging remarks about the other in the 
presence of the minor child of the parties or in a manner in 
which said minor child will be effected. The parties are further 
ordered to encourage love and respect to enable the minor child 
of the parties to have a happy loving relationship with each 
parent without regard to which one he resides with. 
4. The Court hereby orders each of the parties to bear 
their own attorney's fees and costs. 
- 2 -
DATED this^£* day of yj^SM^^ , 198$. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
WAYNE B. WATSON 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
A copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER was 
mailed to Wayne B. Watson, Attorney for Defendant, 2696 North 
University Ave., Suite 200, Provo, Utah 84604; postage prepaid 
this <£$" day of OTcom&r, 198i. 
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